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Newton: Choice and Change of Trust Situs

CHOICE AND CHANGE OF TRUST SITUS
WILLIAM H. NEWTON, lip
INTRODUCTION

Choice of trust situs is a factor of singular importance in international tax
planning. Initially, the tax planner must choose between a domestic or foreign
trust situs.' A domestically sited trust is taxed as a United States citizen; a
foreign trust is taxed as a nonresident. Where a foreign situs is desired, additional factors come into play. These include the nature of the foreign legal
system and the underlying tax burden resulting from placing situs in the
foreign jurisdiction.
Factors which lead to placing the situs within a particular jurisdiction are
typically dynamic and vary with time. For both tax and non-tax reasons, it
may become necessary to change situs from the initial to a new jurisdiction.
There are several methods for changing situs. The optimal method should
minimize both the discontinuity in situs transition and the corresponding tax
impact. This paper will discuss the various means by which a trust situs may
be changed and the factors relevant in deciding which means to use.
INITIAL CHOICE OF TRUST SITUS: DOMESTIC OR FOREIGN

A trust may have either a domestic or foreign situs for United States income
taxation purposes. The distinction is important. A domestic trust is taxed on
worldwide income, while a foreign trust is ordinarily taxed only on income
effectively connected with a United States trade, business, or source with fixeddeterminable income. 2 Unlike foreign trusts, 3 domestic trusts can be classified
as a United States person. 4 This classification is the operational key to the
IRC section 679 grantor trust rule,5 the IRC section 1491 excise tax,6 and other

*William H. Newton, III and Associates, Miami, Florida; Adjunct Professor of Law,
University of Miami; S.M., Massachusetts Institute of Technology; J.D., Southern Methodist
University.
1. For United States income tax purposes, a domestic trust has a United States situs
while a foreign trust has a non-United States situs. See I.R.C. § 641(b) (1976). See also Treas.
Reg. § 1.871-2(a) (1957) (the term "nonresident alien individual" includes a nonresident
fiduciary).
2. Rev. Rul. 73-254, 1973-1 C.B. 613. I.R.C. § 871(a)(2). Noneffectively connected, United
States source capital gain may also be taxed if the 183-day physical presence test is satisfied.
Id. § 871(a)(2). The rate applied is either the 30% rate for fixed-determinable income or a
lower treaty rate. Id.
3. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(30), (31) (1976).
4. Id.
5. Id. § 679.
6. Id. § 1491.
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Code provisions.7 In contrast with domestic trusts, income paid to foreign
trusts may be subject to withholding.8
Classification of a trust as domestic or foreign depends on the underlying
facts and circumstances9 The legislative history of the 1976 Reform Act states:
The Internal Revenue Code does not specify what characteristics must
exist before a trust is treated as being comparable to a nonresident alien
individual. However, Internal Revenue Service rulings and court cases
indicate that this status depends on various factors, such as the residence
of the trustee, the location of the trust assets, the country under whose
laws the trust is created, the nationality of the grantor, and nationality
of the beneficiaries. If an examination of these factors indicates that a
trust has sufficient foreign contracts, it is deemed comparable to a nonresident alien individual and thus is a foreign trust. 10
Other factors relevant to the classification of a trust include place of adminis2
tration" and residence of the grantor or beneficiaries.'
Of these factors the trustee's residence is the most critical in determining
whether the trust is domestic or foreign. 3 For example, in Maximov v. United

7. See, e.g., id. § 367 (foreign corporate transfers); see also id. §§ 951-964 (controlled
foreign corporations). In contrast with § 679, § 1491 is also activated if the transfer is to a

foreign corporation, foreign estate, or foreign partnership.
8. Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-3(f), T.D. 6908, 1967-1 C.B. 222, 229. Furthermore, the trust must

be domestic for trust earnings from a pension or profit sharing plan to be exempt. I.R.C.
§ 401(a) (1976); Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(a)(3) (1956).
9. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(31) (1976) states that the term foreign trust means "[a] trust ... the
income of which, from sources without the United States which is not effectively connected
with the conduct of a trade of business within the United States, is not includible in gross
income under subtitle A." I.R.C. § 1493, repealed in 1967, contained a similar provision
applicable to transfers to avoid tax. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(31) (1976) does not define a foreign
trust, it discusses the tax consequences once a foreign trust is held to exist.
10. H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 206, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2897, 3101 (footnote omitted); S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 215, reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3439, 3645.
11. See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 271, 279 (1971).
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., R. HENDRICKSON & N. SILVERMAN, CHANGING THE SITUs OF A TRuST 12-38
(1982); Kanter, The Foreign Trust -A "One World Concept of Tax Planning", 1970 S. CAL.
TAX

INST. 467 (suggesting that the residence of the trustee is determinative of situs); Note,

Foreign Accumulation Trusts and the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 10 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.

123 (1977) (emphasizing residence of the trustee). See also S. REP. No. 1616, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess. 60 (1960) (defining a foreign trust, in an unsuccessful bill to discourage their use, as a
"trust ... in a foreign country with a nonresident alien as trustee").

I.T. 1885, 11-2 C.B. 164 (1923) provided that the place of creation was controlling by
stating that:
The status of the fiduciary as a citizen or an alien, a resident or a nonresident, has
nothing to do with the status of the trust .... The status of such a trust depends upon
where it was created. If it owes its existence to the laws of a foreign country or of a
political subdivision thereof, it is regarded as a nonresident alien entity.
The trust estate now under discussion is obviously a nonresident alien entity because it owes its existence to the laws of a foreign jurisdiction .,...
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States14 the trust was administered in the United States by a United States
trustee. The United States Supreme Court found the trust domestically sitedI 5
even though the grantor and all beneficiaries were United Kingdom residents. 16
The trustee's residence is interrelated with two other factors, the location
of trust assets and place of administration. These two factors may be controlling if the trustee's residence is not confined to a single jurisdiction or if
a trust has two or more trustees who reside in different jurisdictions. Thus to
insure the creation of a foreign-situs trust no trustee should be a United States
resident.lr This principle is illustrated by the Second Circuit's decision in
B.W. Jones Trust v. Commissioner."s In that case, the trust was created under
English law by an English grantor for English beneficiaries. 19 Three of the
0
trustees were English, and one was a United States citizen and resident.
Approximately 90 percent of trust assets were located and administered in the
United States. The remainder was located and administered in England. The
court held the trust had a domestic situs.1

Id. This result was modified by Rev. Rul. 60-181, 1960-1 C.B. 257. But see Lazarus v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 854 (1972) (treating trusts organized in foreign jurisdictions as having a
foreign situs without addressing other criteria); Bixby v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 757 (1972).
14. 373 U.S. 49 (1963).
15. Id. at 53.
16. The court below indicated that the trust assets were located in the United States
when it pointed out that the capital gains at issue were realized in the United States. United
States v. Maximov, 299 F.2d 565, 566-67 (2d Cir. 1962).
17. For example, in Rev. Rul. 70-242, 1970-1 C.B. 89, a trust was created in Canada by a
Canadian organization as grantor. Only United States residents were beneficiaries and all
trusts were located in the United States. Some of the trustees were American citizens and
residents and others were Canadian. Most administrative functions were performed in the
United States, although bookkeeping was conducted in Canada. The ruling concluded that
the situs of the trust was the United States.
18. 132 F.2d 914 (4th Cir. 1943), af'g, 46 B.T.A. 531 (1942).
19. Though the grantor created five trusts, they all reflected identical characteristics and
functioned as a single trust entity. Id. at 915.
20. The United States trustee usually followed the advice of one of the English trustees.
Cf. Rev. Rul. 55-200, 1955-1 C.B. 633 (foreign trust arose where United States bank acted as
agent in the United States for Canadian trustee).
21. In reaching this conclusion the court stressed:
A problem somewhat similar to the one before us has been considered in determining
the "situs" of trusts for purposes of taxation. Bogert in his treatise "Trusts and Trustees", vol. 2, ch. 15, sec. 262, p. 842, states: "Where there are two or more trustees
residing in different states, the courts are in fairly general agreement, where a different
rule is not established by statute, that the property will be taxable in the state of
residence of the trustee who has actual custody or control of it ..
"
Jones Trust v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 531, 536 (1942), aff'd, 132 F.2d 914 (4th Cir. 1943).
The outcome may have been different in the absence of the single United States resident
trustee. See R. HENDRICKSON & N. SILVERMAN, CHANGING THE SITUS OF A TRUST 12-38 (1982).
See also Treas. Reg. § 1.643(a)-6(b), ex. (1) (1956) (foreign trust existed where trust had
foreign trustee though portion of trust corpus invested in United States assets). The effect
of the decision under prior law was to subject United States source capital gain to taxation.
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Selecting the optimum foreign situs requires careful consideration of the
foreign legal system and the underlying tax impact which results from placing
situs in that jurisdiction.22 That impact is dependent on the tax burden imposed by the situs and the availability of income tax treaty benefits. To claim
treaty benefits not otherwise available, trust situs may be divided from the
jurisdiction of creation.
ForeignSitus: The Legal System and Tax Impact
Civil law jurisdictions, such as France 2 3 Germany, 24 Venezuela, 25 and the
Netherlands Antilles20 generally neither authorize nor expressly prohibit creation of trusts.2 7 Attempts to create a trust in these jurisdictions may result in
invalidity. 28 Certain civil law jurisdictions have modified internal law to
accommodate the trust. 29 Choosing such a jurisdiction, however, can lead to
unexpected results and should be avoided. In Estate of Oei T. Swan,30 foreign
22. In addition to distinctions in tax consequences, a foreign trust may afford a greater
degree of confidentiality.
23. In re Tabbagh's Estate, 167 Misc. 156, 3 N.Y.S.2d 542 (Sur. Ct. 1938). See also Comments and Notes, Trust and Estate Planning in France after "Epoux Courtors" and "Dome
B", 16 INrr'L LAw. 70 (1982).
24. In re Hirschmann's Estate, 124 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sur. Ct. 1953).

25. Buckley v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1312 (1954), aff'd per curiam, 231 F.2d 204 (2d Cir.
1956).

26. See also infra notes 50-63 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., In re Hirschmann's Estate, 124 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sur. Ct. 1953) (trust essentially
a common law concept); In re Estate of Cook, 204 Misc. 704, 123 N.Y.S.2d 568 (Sur. Ct. 1953),
aff'd, 283 A.D. 1047, 131 N.Y.S.2d 882 (App. Div. 1954). See also F. WEIS.R, TRUSTS ON THE
CONTINENT OF EUROPE 60 (1936) ("there exists [in civil law jurisdictions] . . . no statutory
proviso, case law, doctrine, practice, tendency, habit of thought or general desire favoring or
even consistent with ...

the Anglo Saxon trust"); Lepaulle, Civil Law Substitutes for Trusts,

36 YALE LJ.1126 (1927) (comparing trust to "those extraordinary drugs curing at the same
time toothache, sprained ankles, and baldness sold by peddlers on the Paris boulevards");
Nussbaum, Sociological and Comparative Aspects of the Trust, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 408 (1938).
See generally W. NEwTON, INTERNATIONAL ESTATE PLANNING §§ 2.25-.28 (1981).

28. See, e.g., In re Estate of Strauss, 75 Misc. 2d 454, 347 N.Y.S.2d 840 (Sur. Ct. 1973)
(trust invalid as to realty situated in Germany). See also In re Renard, 108 Misc. 2d 31, 437
N.Y.S.2d 860 (Sur. Ct. 1981) (domiciliary of civil law jurisdiction can establish common law
trust to avoid forced heir restrictions at domicile).
Civil law jurisdictions may authorize trust equivalents. See, e.g., Estate of Zietz, 34 T.C.
351 (1960) (analyzing German civil law substitute). Civil law jurisdictions have recognized
the common law trust in international debt financing. See Rich, International Debt Obligations of Enterprises in Civil Law Countries; The Problem of Bondholder Representation, 21
VA. J. INT'L L. 269 (1981). International organizations such as the International Monetary

Fund utilize the trust though their members consist of civil law jurisdictions. See Trust Funds
in International Law: the Contribution of the International Monetary Fund to a Code of
Principles,72 AM. J. or INT'L L. 856 (1978).
29. See generally J. SCHOENBLUM, MULTISTATE AND MULTINATIONAL ESTATE PLANNING 689,

787 (1982). Political subdivisions based on civil law which now accommodate the trust should
also be avoided. See, e.g., Civil Code of Lower Canada, arts. 981 a-n (Cliff 1939) (Quebec);
Civil Code of Puerto Rico §§ 834-874 (1930 ed.).
30. 24 T.C. 829 (1955), reu'd and rem'd on other grounds, 247 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1957).
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Stiftungs (trusts) were organized in both Liechtenstein and Switzerland, each
a civil law jurisdiction. The Stiftungs were treated as revocable entities for
estate taxation, but as separate corporate-like juridical entities for income tax
purposes.5 1
In contrast to civil law jurisdictions, common law jurisdictions expressly
authorize trusts. Suitable common law jurisdictions for trust creation should
be those with little or no taxation, 32 such as the Bahamas, Barbados, 33 Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Grand Cayman Islands, and Hong
Kong. 34 The selected jurisdiction should also have favorable laws concerning
trust validity, administration, and restraints on alienation3 5 Because violation
of the rules against perpetuities or accumulations3 6 can result in invalidation
of the trust, the underlying foreign law governing these issues must be fully
developed and subject to clear resolution37 Thus, the tax planner must analyze
conflict of laws principles to ascertain the controlling law.
31. The precise classification of the entities as trusts or corporations was not determined
for the purpose of estate taxation. See Swan v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 1957),
rev'g, 24 T.C. 829 (1955). Instead, they were simply characterized as revocable under I.R.C.
§ 2038 (1976). Id. In contrast, in Aramo-Stiftung v. Commissioner, 172 F.2d 896 (2d Cir.
1949), a Stiftung was treated as a separate juridical entity for income taxation.
There may be other pitfalls where a civil law jurisdiction apparently authorizes use of a
trust. For example, Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(a) (1960), defining a trust as an arrangement
subject to "the ordinary rules applied in chancery or probate courts," could be construed as
limiting the trust to common law judicial forums.
Furthermore, the basic civil law relationships is based on contractual rather than fiduciary
principles. Civil law commentators often refer to le contrat du trust. See, e.g., Trust - Institu-

tion juridique anglo-saxonne.- Jurisprudence francaise, 38 J. Do

DROIT INTERNAT'L PRIRE

134

(1911).
32. Many common law jurisdictions are unsuitable because they are high tax jurisdictions. These include Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. But see
Comment, Foreign Situs Trusts: The Option of Utilizing a High Taxation Jurisdiction, 52
TEX. L. REV. 949 (1974) (benefits from creating a foreign trust in high tax jurisdiction).
33. See Zagaris, Barbados Develops as a Low Tax Jurisdiction, 15 INT'L LAW. 673, 680
(1981). Barbados was covered by the former United Kingdom treaty prior to its termination
by the United States. See Table of Territories to which the convention of the 16th April, 1945,
is to be Extended, II TAX TREATIES (P-H) f 89,156.
34. Hong Kong is a low rather than a no tax haven. Its rate of taxation on personal
income is 15%. See M. LANCER, PRACTICAL INTERNATIONAL TAX PLANNING 2 (2d ed. 1979)
(classifying jurisdiction imposing maximum 20% rate as a low tax haven).
35. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 268-277 (1971).
36. The rule against perpetuities is a rule against remoteness of vesting. At common
law it provided that property ownership must vest in a beneficiary not later than 21 years
(plus periods of gestation) after lives in being. See generally L. SimEs, FTrruRE INTERESTS 289328 (2d ed. 1966). The rule against accumulations restricts the period during which income
can be accumulated within a trust. At common law its period coincided with that of the
rule against perpetuities. Id. Both rules have been statutorily modified. The period of each
may vary not only within the same jurisdiction, but from one jurisdiction to another.
37. Bermuda applies the common law rule against perpetuities but does not restrict
accumulations. Grand Cayman allows avoidance of the rule against perpetuities for up to
100 years in the case of exempted trusts. In Hong Kong the rule against perpetuities requires vesting of property within al period of 80 years from creation of the trust or 21 years
after lives in being on creation of the trust. The Hong Kong rule against income accumulation is limited to one of six noncumulative periods. J. SCHOENBLUM, supra note 29, at 786
(discusses Hong Kong's Perpetuities and Accumulations Ordinance).
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The Effect of Income Tax Treaties on Trusts
Income tax treaties provide important tax advantages not otherwise available under the internal law of the contracting foreign jurisdictions.38 A trust
must meet the treaty's standing requirement before these advantages are available. Many recent treaties expressly grant standing to trusts39 provided the
trust is taxed as a resident of the treaty jurisdiction.4 ° If the trust is not taxed,
standing is based on the status of the grantor or beneficiaries.&4 1 Other treaties
38. See Appendix (official citations for each United States income tax treaty). In this
discussion of United States income tax treaties, citation is made only by reference to the
foreign contracting state. Treaty advantages include restriction of jurisdiction to tax in the
country of source and relief from double taxation.
39. For example, the United Kingdom treaty defines "persons" entitled to protection as
including "an individual, a corporation, a partnership, an estate, a trust and any other body
of persons." United Kingdom, art. 3(l)(c).
40. The United Kingdom treaty states:
(1) For the purposes of this convention:
(a) the term "resident of the United Kingdom" means:
(i) any person ....
resident in the United Kingdom for the purposes of United Kingdom tax; but in the case of a partnership, estate, or trust, only to the extent that the
income derived by such partnership, estate, or trust is subject to United Kingdom tax
as the income of a resident, either in its hands or in the hands of its partners or beneficiaries;...
(b) the term "resident of the United States" means:
(i) any person ....
resident in the United States for the purposes of United States tax;
but in the case of a partnership, estate, or trust, only to the extent that the income derived by such partnership, estate or trust is subject to United States tax as the income
of a resident, either in its hands or in the hands of its partnersor beneficiaries; ...
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Dec. 31, 1975, United States-United
Kingdom, art. IV, para. 1, U.S.T. _.
T.I.A.S. No. 9682 (emphasis added). See also Rev.
Proc. 81-58, 1981-2 C.B. 678 (analyzing this provision of the United Kingdom treaty).
Analogous qualifications are contained in other existing treaties. See, e.g., Convention for
the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Feb. 12, 1979, United States- Hungary, art. IV, para. 1,
30 U.S.T. 6357, T.I.A.S. No. 9560; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, May 7,
1975, United States -Iceland, art. 3, para. 1, 26 U.S.T. 2004, T.I.A.S. No. 8151; Convention
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Dec. 4, 1973, United States- Romania, art. III, par.
1, 27 U.S.T. 165, T.I.A.S. No. 8228; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Dec.
3, 1971, United States-Norway, art. III, para. 1, 23"U.S.T. 2832, T.I.A.S. No. 7474; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, July 9, 1970, United States- Belgium, art. IV,
para. 1, 23 U.S.T. 2687, T.I.A.S. No. 7463. See also Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation, June 4, 1976, United States -Korea, art. III, para. 1, 30 U.S.T. 5253, T.I.A.S. No.
9506 (expressly qualifying standing as to fiduciary). The draft of the United States model
income tax treaty dated June 16, 1981, and many proposed treaties adopt this approach. See
Draft of United States Model Treaty, art. 4, para. 1; Argentina, art. 4, para. 1; Bangladesh,
art. 4, par. 1; Cyprus, art. 3(1); Egypt, art. 3(l); Malta, art. 4(1); Philippines, art. 3(l).
41. But see Treasury Department Technical Explanation of U.S. - Jamaica Income Tax
Treaty, I TAX TR_ATES (P-H) ff 55,136 (trust which constitutes tax exempt charitable organization or pension fund continues to be entitled to standing).
The Treasury's amended technical explanation of the United Kingdom treaty provides
"the treatment of income received by a trust or estate will be determined by the residence
and taxation of the person subject to tax on such income, which may be the grantor, the
beneficiaries or the trust or estate itself, as the case may be." See Amended Treasury Department Technical Explanation of U.S.- U.K. Income Tax Treaty, II TAx TmTiEs (P-H)
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implicitly accord standing to residents of each contracting state. Many treaties
leave the definition of this term to the law of the jurisdiction whose taxes are
at issue.42 Other treaties define resident in terms which do not expressly include the term trust.43 Application of income tax treaty standing requirements
varies depending on whether taxation of the grantor, the trust, or the beneficiaries is at issue.
In the case of a grantor trust, the grantor's status alone is the key. The
grantor must have standing independently to claim treaty benefits. This
principle is illustrated by Revenue Ruling 80-15. 44 There an Italian corporation created a domestic trust. The trust was a grantor trust because the
corporation reserved the power to revoke, modify, or amend. The trust was
created for the purpose of filing suit against a domestic corporation to recover
patent royalties. The Italian treaty exempts royalties from United States taxation. This exemption was available because the grantor was entitled to
45
standing.
In nongrantor trusts, standing is based on the status of the trust, the beneficiaries, or both. Where trust income is distributed currently, standing is tied
4
entirely to the beneficiaries' status.
ff 89,064. Technical explanations of other treaties contain identical language. See Treasury
Department Technical Explanation of U.S.-Iceland Income Tax Treaty, I TAX TREATIES
(P-H) Uf
46,137.
The technical explanations of a number of treaties refer only to the trust or beneficiaries,
not the grantor. See Treasury Department Technical Explanation of U.S.- Hungary Income
Tax Treaty, I TAx TREATIes (P-H) U 45,130. Other explanations cover only the trust and
neither the beneficiaries nor the grantor. See Treasury Department Technical Explanation of
U.S. - Jamaica Income Tax Treaty, I. TAx Treaties (P-H) U55,136.
42. See, e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Dec. 30, 1965, United
States -Netherlands, arts. 11(2), VII, VIII, IX, X, XIV, XVI, XVIII, XIX, 17 U.S.T. 896,
T.I.A.S. No. 6051.
43. The definition may be keyed to the term "person" with that term defined as including "an individual . . . and any other body of persons." See France, arts. 2(l)(c), 3;
Japan, arts. 2(l)(d), 3; New Zealand, art. II (e), (j). Other treaties expressly provide that
"person" includes not only an individual but also a fiduciary. See also Finland, art. 3, para.
I & 2; Korea, art. 3(1). A further approach is to omit the intermediate definition of person
and tie the term "resident" directly to the terms "individual" or "any other body of persons."
See, e.g., U.S.S.R., art. II, para. 3 & 4.
44. Rev. Rul. 80-15, 1980-1 C.B. 365.
45. The ruling raises two additional issues: (1) whether the domestic trust constituted a
permanent establishment, and (2) whether the amount received was indeed a royalty. If the
trust constituted a permanent eslablishment of the Italian corporation, the exemption was
unavailable. See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Mar. 30, 1955, United
States-Italy, art. VII, 7 U.S.T. 2999, T.I.A.S. No. 3679. Because the trust neither had nor
exercised general agency authority in the United States on behalf of the corporation, it did
not constitute a permanent establishment. Id., art. II (1)(c). As to the second issue, because
the amount ultimately received was in lieu of the amount required under the patent agreement, the recovery was a royalty payment under the treaty. See also United States-Italian
Income Tax Treaty, Reg. § 512.7 (standing accorded beneficiaries of domestic trusts whose
tax liability is at issue and who are residents of Italy).
46. See Amended Treasury Department Technical Explanation of U.S.- U.K. Income
Tax Treaty, II TAx TREATIEs (P-H) Uf89,064. Regulations under a number of older treaties
expressly provide that a beneficiary can claim standing independently of the trust. See, e.g.,
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If the trust income is accumulated, both the -beneficiaries and the trust
must satisfy standing requirements.47 Beneficiaries otherwise entitled to protection lose treaty benefits if income is accumulated unless the trust also can
claim protection. For example, in Maximov v. United States48 the grantor and
beneficiaries were citizens and residents of the United Kingdom and the trust
was domestic. The trust realized United States source capital gain which was
accumulated rather than distributed currently. A former United States-United
Kingdom income tax treaty exempted capital gain realized by a resident of the
United Kingdom from United States taxation. Even though the beneficiaries
were entitled to this treaty benefit, the trust was not a resident of the United
Kingdom and could not claim the exemption. If the income had been distributed currently, the beneficiaries' status would have been the only consideration and the exemption would have been available. 49
Dividing Trust Situs from Jurisdictionof Creation
To attain the treaty benefits of a civil law country, the jurisdiction of trust
situs may be divided from the jurisdiction of creation. Because the trust is not
indigenous to a civil law jurisdiction,50 it is ordinarily not feasible to claim
treaty benefits through creating a trust in such a jurisdiction. 51 For income
taxation purposes, however, trust situs may be established in a separate jurisdiction apart from the jurisdiction of creation. The jurisdiction of creation
does not control situs.52 Instead, situs is based on the underlying facts and
circumstances. 53 Thus a proper focusing on the facts and circumstances can
lead to establishing situs in a civil law jurisdiction separate and apart from the
54
jurisdiction of creation.
United States-Italian Income Tax Treaty, Reg. § 512.7. Though these regulations do not
expressly distinguish between current and accumulation distributions, it is implicit that they
cover only the former. Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49 (1963).
Distributions to trust beneficiaries are expressly covered by the Canadian treaty. It states:
A resident of one of the contracting States who is a beneficiary of an estate or trust
of the other contracting State shall be exempt from tax by such other State with respect
to that portion of any amount paid, credited, or required to be distributed by such
estate or trust to such beneficiary out of income from sources without such other State.
See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Oct. 25, 1966, United States - Canada,
art. XIII E, 18 U.S.T. 3186, T.I.A.S. No. 6415. In the case of a beneficiary of a domestic trust
residing in Canada, this provision would appear to preclude taxation of the beneficiary on
effectively connected foreign source income. See I.R.C. § 864(c)(4), (5) (1976).
47. The distributable net income of a foreign trust includes income from United States
sources which are otherwise exempt by treaty. See I.R.C. § 1.643(a)-6(b), ex. (1)(b) (1980).
48. 373 U.S. 49 (1963).
49. The exemption would also have been available if the trust were a grantor trust.
50. See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
51. But see supra note 28 (civil law trust equivalent).
52. See Rev. Rul. 60-181, 1960-1 C.B. 257.
53. The most important of these is the trustee's residence. See supra notes 13-16 and
accompanying text.
54. Liechtenstein (a nontreaty jurisdiction) and Switzerland (a treaty jurisdiction) are
based on civil law. Each provides the means of establishing trust situs in their respective
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This approach is subject to two restrictions5s The first is based on the
conflict of laws principle concerning the validity of the trust. 56 This principle
requires the law which governs trust validity to bear a sufficient nexus5 7 to the
trust. A sufficient nexus can exist at the outset of the trust even though the
jurisdiction of creation and trust situs are separately established~5 Otherwise,
situs can be changed to the desired jurisdiction only after creation. 59
The second restriction involves whether the treaty at issue expressly or
implicitly accords standing to trusts. 60 Treaties expressly granting standing to
trusts do so only to the extent the trust is taxed as a resident of the treaty
jurisdiction.1 In a civil law jurisdiction, trusts are typically not taxed as a
resident of that jurisdiction.
In contrast, treaties which implicitly grant standing may not require taxation by the treaty jurisdiction to permit claims of treaty benefits. 2 Instead,
such jurisdictions determine trust situs through their internal laws. If that law
deems the trust situs in the treaty jurisdiction, treaty benefits should be availjurisdiction in creation of a trust in a common law jurisdiction. See Personen und Gesellschaftsrecht art. 931 (PGR - Personal Status and Company Law Act-Liechenstein); Code des
Obligationsart. 401 (Switzerland).
55. Additional restrictions may be imposed by the situs jurisdiction. In Liechtenstein,
trusts ordinarily must be publically registered. Failure to register can result in a fine, the
amount of which depends on whether nonregistration was willful.
56. Invalidity may result in failure of the trust. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF
LAWS §§ 411-429 (1971). Other conflict of laws issues may arise including administration and
restraints on alienation.
57. Id. §§ 269, 270 (jurisdiction governing trust validity must bear substantial relation
to trust).
58. The Restatement (Second) keys existence of a substantial relation to the trust's status
as testamentary or inter vivos. In the case of a testamentary trust:
[A jurisdiction] has a substantial relation to a trust when it is the state in which the
trust is to be administered; or that of the place of business or domicile of the trustee
at the time of the testator's death, or that of the domicile of the testator at that time,
or that of the domicile of the beneficiaries. There may be other contacts or groupings
of contacts which will likewise suffice.
Id. § 269 comment f. For an inter vivos trust, a jurisdiction has a substantial relation when
it is that:
[W]hich the settlor designated as that in which the trust is to be administered, or that
of the place of business or domicile of the trustee at the time of the creation of the
trust, or that of the location of the trust assets at that time, or that of the domicile of
the settlor, at that time, or that of the domicile of the beneficiaries. There may be
other contacts or groupings of contacts which will likewise suffice.
Id. § 270 comment b. For both testamentary and inter vios trusts, the nature of these contacts is such that the jurisdiction of creation and trust situs may be separately established
at the outset. Thus, the common law jurisdiction (the jurisdiction of creation) can control
trust validity and the civil law jurisdiction determine situs.
59. See infra notes 64-143 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
61. Id.
62. This includes treaties with Austria, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles, and Switzerland. See supra note 42.
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able despite the absence of taxation by -the treaty jurisdiction.63 For example,
the Netherlands Antilles is a civil law jurisdiction which does not recognize
trusts, but does have a favorable income tax treaty with the United States.
CHANGE OF TRUST Srrus

The situs of an existing trust may be changed from one jurisdiction to
another for both tax and non-tax reasons.6 4 Tax reasons for shifting situs include moving the trust from one foreign jurisdiction to another to take advantage of the latter's tax haven status or to claim the benefit of an income tax
treaty. Shifting from a foreign to a domestic situs may avoid the impact of
section 668 interest charge,6 5 section 679 grantor trust rule, 66 or income tax
withholding requirements on foreign trusts. 67 For nonresidents, changing situs
from domestic to foreign may avoid state and city taxes68 or preclude federal
taxation of noneffectively connected foreign income. 9
Non-tax reasons for changing situs include avoiding local exchange con63. See supra notes 44-49.
64. The broad policy bases for effecting a situs change irrespective of the reasons have
been succinctly captured:
Thus, in a time when people easily move their houses, their assets, and themselves from
state to state and country to country, it should follow that their trusts should be able
to follow them. Their trusts should not have to remain behind, stuck in the same out
situs, to suffer whatever adverse consequences may threaten them there. To carry the
argument a step further, why should a trust not be able to move its situs elsewhere
even when its grantor and beneficiaries do not move, whenever good reasons for such
a move are not exclusively economic?
See R. H NDmCKSON & N.

SILVEMIAN,

CHANGING THE SIrus OF A TRUST V

(1982).

65. The extent the interest charge can be avoided is directly related to the procedure
chosen for changing situs. See infra notes 72-129 and accompanying text. A change in the
character of trust assets can avoid the impact of § 668 without a situs shift. An example is
interest from tax-exempt bonds. See I.R.C. § 103 (West Supp. 1983). In the case of an accumulation distribution, this interest retains its character even in the hands of a United
States citizen or resident beneficiaries. Id. § 667(a).
66. Avoidance of the § 679 grantor trust rule is also related to the procedure chosen for
shifting situs. See infra notes 72-129 and accompanying text. Tax-exempt interest avoids the
impact of § 679 without a situs change. This interest is not taxed to the grantor under § 679.
67. Treas. Reg. §1.1441-3(f) T.D. 6908, 1967-1 C.B. 222, 229; Rev. Rul. 65-311, 1965-2 C.B.
322. An additional tax reason for changing from a foreign to domestic situs is the taxation
entirely to the trust, rather than ultimately to the beneficiaries, of accumulated capital gain
allocated to corpus and income accumulated by the trust before the beneficiary attains the
age of 21. I.R.C. §§ 643(a)(3), 665(b) (1976). The effect is to allow rate shifting from that paid
by a higher income beneficiary to a lower trust rate. Distinctions also exist between foreign
and domestic trusts in computation of the foreign tax credit and in pension or profit sharing
plans. I.R.C. §§ 665, 667(e), 901, 904 (West Supp. 1983).
68. These same taxes may be avoided by retaining a domestic situs (in the United States)
but merely shifting situs location from one state to another.. For United States citizens and
residents, this course is usually more appropriate since a shift from domestic to foreign may
trigger §§ 668, 679, or 1491.
69. In contrast with nonresidents, United States citizens or residents are taxed on worldwide income. I.R.C. § l(a) (Supp. V 1981); I.R.C. § 11(a) (Supp. II 1978); I.R.C. § 61(a)
(Supp. IV 1980).
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trols, forced heirship or probate. A situs change may additionally prevent
recharacterization of property interests upon change of domicile or may protect
property from confiscation by a politically unstable jurisdiction. A situs shift
may also facilitate trust administration and reduce administration expenses if
the trustee or primary beneficiary has recently changed residence.70
The tax impact of changing jurisdictional situs is directly related to the
procedure chosen for effecting the change. Three basic procedures 71 are available for changing situs and the tax impact under each is geared to the nature
of the situs change and whether a distribution or transfer72 is deemed to have
70. A shift in the primary beneficiary's residence does not also require a shift in the
existing trustee's residence to effect a change of situs. Instead, situs may be changed through
appointment of a new trustee in the new jurisdiction with a corresponding shift in beneficial
rights in trust assets to him from the old jurisdiction.
71. This analysis of procedure relates principally to trusts other than those classified as
revocable. The situs of a revocable trust may be shifted pursuant to the grantor's reserved
power to amend. Cf. Estate of Denzer, 29 T.C. 237 (1957) (relinquishment of powers to
amend and make testamentary disposition did not amount to termination of old trust or
creation of new one). Alternatively, the trust could merely be revoked and a new one established in the desired jurisdiction. Cf. Becklenberg's Estate v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 297
(7th Cir. 1959) (initial trust revoked and assets transferred to new trust for purchase of
annuity). The finding of revocability in Buhl v. Kavanagh, 118 F.2d 315 (6th Cir. 1941), may
have been an important distinguishing feature in gauging viability of the second procedure.
See infra notes 94-121 and accompanying text.
72. A distribution or transfer for this analysis is one given effect for federal tax purposes.
It may result from disposition of either bare legal title or equitable title to trust assets. It
may but need not involve an actual transfer of assets. However, absence of a transfer in fact
may be an ineffective means to deal with the reasons for changing situs in the first instance.
The distribution on transfer must in any event be one so complete as to put the property
legally beyond recall. This is illustrated by Lynchburg Trust & Savings Bank v. Commissioner,
68 F.2d 356 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 292 U.S. 640 (1934). The decedent placed the residue of
his estate in trust. Income arising therefrom was divided into three parts. One-half went to
his child and one-quarter went to each of his two grandchildren. His child's income was
distributed currently while most of the grandchildrens' income was accumulated. Id. at 357.
The Service contended the decedent had created only one trust and the accumulated income
was taxed in its entirety to that trust. Id. at 358. The court rejected this contention. It concluded the decedent had created three separate trusts. The first covered only the residue.
The second and third covered income accumulated for each of the grandchildren. This income was treated as paid or credited by the first to the second and third trusts so as to vest
absolute property rights in the ultimate beneficiaries subject only to postponement of
possession. Tax liability was split between the second and third trusts. Id. at 361. See also
Duke v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 1264 (1938) (trust income not currently taxed to ultimate
beneficiaries in absence of immediate right of receipt). But see I.R.C. § 667(c) (1976) (benefits of multiple trusts restricted).
A different result was reached in Urquhart v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1942).
The decedent placed shares of stock in trust. A second trustee was named for the rest,
residue, and remainder of the trust estate. The first trust received stock dividends which were
allocated to the second trustee. A significant portion of the income was accumulated. Id. at
703. Accumulation was to continue until the designated beneficiary reached 30, but if the
beneficiary died before then accumulated income was to be paid to a separate beneficiary.
Id. at 702. The taxpayers argued two separate trusts were created, one for the stock and one
for accumulated income. Id. at 703. The court concluded there was only one trust. It reasoned
that because the designated beneficiary had not reached 30, he had no vested interest in the
accumulated income. Thus, no distribution occurred to any second trust and no deduction
was allowed for the first. Id. at 704.
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occurred. The first procedure involves modifying those factors which led to
establishing situs in the initial jurisdiction. This includes appointing a trustee
in the new jurisdiction with a corresponding situs shift from the initial jurisdiction. The second procedure is to terminate the trust in the initial jurisdiction and concurrently establish a trust in the new jurisdiction with identical
terms and assets. Under the third procedure situs is changed by decanting the
trust. The initial trust makes either a total or partial transfer of trust assets to
a separate, distinct trust created in the new jurisdiction.
Situs FactorRetracingor Modification
The procedure which best minimizes the discontinuity in a situs transition
is one that retraces or modifies those factors leading to the initial establishment of situs. This is so regardless of whether the nature of the situs change is
from a foreign to domestic jurisdiction, a domestic to foreign, or from one
foreign jurisdiction to another. The trust does not terminate upon situs transition but continues to exist with its situs repositioned. No separate, distinct
trust is created; instead, the trust before situs change retains its identity and is
synonymous with that after the shift. The control of trust assets shifts from the
trustee in the initial jurisdiction to the trustee in the new jurisdicion.
Under this procedure the situs change is given effect where the new trustee
is a resident of the new jurisdiction and substantially all of the trust assets are
maintained there. Arguably, corporate rather than individual trustees are preferred under this procedure. Mere presence of an individual trustee in a
jurisdiction outside the existing situs may lead the Service to argue that an
inadvertent change in situs has occurred. Because an individual may have
more than one residence,73 this argument can be made even if the trustee has
not abandoned his residence at the situs. Furthermore, with a foreign trust,
the trustee's presence in the United States for 183 days or more will result in
the taxation of capital gain.7 4 These undesirable effects may be minimized by
selecting a corporation organized in the situs jurisdiction as trustee.7 5
Despite this preference for corporate trustees, if the trustee is an individual,
it is theoretically .possible to shift trust situs without changing trustees. The
existing trustee may simply abandon his present residence and acquire a new
one in the targeted jurisdiction. Yet this approach is problematic. The Service
may argue that the new residence was never acquired or that the existing
residence was never abandoned. In either event, the effect would be a continuation of the existing trust situs.
The tax impact of using this first procedure to change a trust's situs from
foreign to domestic was partly addressed in two private letter rulings.,6 Each
73. See Treas. Reg. § 1.871-2(b) (1957) (residency of individual trustee keyed to immigration status and length of stay in United States).

74. I.R.C. § 871(a)(2) (1976).
75. Unless the foreign corporate trustee avoids engaging in a United States trade or
business, it may be classified as a United States resident. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-5 (1960).
This could trigger an inadvertent change in situs.
76. See Ltr. Rul. 7917037 (Jan. 24, 1979); Ltr. Rul. 7917063 (Jan. 25, 1979). The focus
was on the change from a foreign to domestic trustee. Id. Stern v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.
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ruling concluded that the situs change was not a "transfer" of property constituting a gift for gift tax purposes. The letters reasoned that the grantor had
parted with dominion and control over trust property on the transfer to the
trust in the initial jurisdiction. No additions to trust corpus were made after
the situs change.
Two additional rationales are implicit in the rulings. First, only bare legal
title passed from the initial to the new trustee. The gift tax applies only to
transfer of a beneficial interest, not to a transfer of bare legal title to a
trustee.7 7 Second, because the trust retained its identity with the situs shift,
the transfer was complete at the creation of the initial trust. In effect, no
separate, distinct transfer occurred.78
The letter rulings failed to address the impact of issues resulting from
domestication of a foreign trust such as the section 668 interest charge7 and
the section 679 grantor trust rule. 0 The section 668 interest charge is triggered
upon an accumulation distribution to the beneficiary of a foreign trust.8 ' The
Service should not treat the situs change as a taxable distribution or transfer
of property because the trust retains its identity under this first procedure.
After the situs shift, however, accumulation distributions may occur. In that
event, it is unclear whether the controlling date is that of subsequent distribution or prior accumulation. If the subsequent distribution date controls, section 668 is literally inapplicable because the trust is no longer foreign but
domestic.
The throwback rules could change this result if the controlling date was
prior accumulation. These rules carry accumulation distributions back to the
earliest "preceding taxable year" for which the trust had undistributed net
614 (1981), is analogous. There the shift was from the Bahamas to the Cayman Islands. The
court stated:
The Hylton trust changed its situs to the Cayman Islands as of March 28, 1972, in
accordance with petitioner's earlier demand. This change was effected by the resignation of Wobaco Trust (Bahamas) as trustee and the appointment by petitioner of
NVobaco Trust (Cayman) as the successor trustee. Despite the change of trustees, the
records of the Hylton trust continued to be maintained by Wobaco Trust (Bahamas)
until sometime in February 1973.
Id. at 623 (emphasis added).
77. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(g)(1) (1958).
78. The rulings do not state whether a change in location of trust assets occurred. The
trust administered real property in the United States prior to domestication. See Ltr. Rul.
7917037 (Jan. 24, 1979); Ltr. Rul. 7917063 (Jan. 25, 1979).
79. The taxpayers initially requested rulings that § 668 was inapplicable. The requests
were withdrawn.
80. Other issues not addressed were § 644, estate taxation, and the generation-skipping
transfer tax. Section 644 imposes a special two-year tax on the trust, geared to the grantor's
tax rate. I.R.C. § 644(a)(2) (Supp. II 1978). This tax is normally inapplicable based on the
second implicit rationale of the letter rulings that there is no transfer treated as occurring
due to retention of trust identity. An exception arises if the grantor is treated as making an
indirect transfer to the foreign trust. Estate taxation and the generation-skipping transfer
tax can also be avoided based on this same rationale.
81. I.R.C. §§ 667(a)-(b), 668 (Supp. III 1979).
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income.8 2 Whether the definition of preceding taxable year relates to the time
of trust creation or accumulation is not entirely clear.83 Nevertheless, if at
either time the trust was foreign, section 668 would be triggered.8 4
Section 679 grantor trust rule extends to direct and indirect transfers of
property. 5 The following three elements must exist for this rule to apply: the
grantor must be a United States person;80 the direct or indirect transfer of
property must be made by the grantor to a foreign trust;8 7 and the trust must
have a United States beneficiary88
A foreign trust subject to section 679 may be able to remove the taint by
changing situs. Though section 679 could theoretically be construed as requiring continued coverage despite domestication, this construction contravenes the policy bases underlying the section. 9 The proper construction is
that section 679 applies only as long as a trust retains its foreign situs. 9o The
situs change may be from domestic to foreign or from one foreign jurisdiction
to another, rather than foreign to domestic. In either event under the first
procedure no new trust is brought into existence after the shift. Based on the
implicit rationale of the private letter rulings,9 ' a disposition or transfer of
property should not be treated as occurring. Completion of the situs shift to a
foreign jurisdiction, however, may activate section 67992 or section 668.93

82. I.R.C. § 666(a) (1976).
83. See id. § 665(e) (referring to creation in case of foreign trust created by United States
person).
84. The importance of whether the preceding taxable year is tied to creation or accumulation comes into play after domestication. If it is creation, § 668 would continue to
have theoretical application to income accumulated even after domestication.
85. I.R.C. § 679(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
86. Id.
87. Id.

88. Id. If a trust satisfying the first two elements later acquires a United States beneficiary, § 679 is automatically triggered for the year of acquisition. Id. § 679(c).
89. See S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 219-20, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 3439, 3649-50 discussing application of I.R.C. § 679 to foreign trusts).
90. Analogous issues are raised if a United States resident grantor subsequently becomes
a nonresident.
91. See Ltr. Rul. 7917037 (Jan. 24, 1979); Ltr. Rul. 7917063 (Jan. 25, 1979).
92. The legislative history provides that a domestic to foreign situs shift is an indirect
transfer for purposes of § 679. See S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 219-20, reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &-AD. Nxws 3439, 3649-50. Factors which must exist before the transfer
is treated as indirectly made by the grantor is uncertain. A power vested in the grantor to
change trustees would obviously suffice. An advance understanding or preconceived plan of
action would likewise be fatal. See Zimmerman, Using Foreign Trusts in the Post-1976 Period:
What PossibilitiesRemain?, 47 J. TAX'N 12, 15 (1977).

93. In a domestic to foreign situs shift, if the controlling date is subsequent distribution,

§ 668 could theoretically apply to all accumulated income even that accumulated prior to
the shift. In contrast, if the controlling date were prior accumulation rather than subsequent
distribution application of § 668 would depend on whether the definition of preceding
taxable year for the throwback rules is keyed to trust creation or accumulation. If trust
creation controls, § 668 could be rendered entirely inapplicable even as to income accumulated after situs transition.
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Termination
The second procedure for changing trust situs is through termination.
Under this procedure, the initial trust is liquidated, 94 and trust assets including current and accumulated income are distributed to the beneficiaries. 95 The
beneficiaries concurrently create and fund a separate, distinct trust in the new
jurisdiction with terms identical to those of the initial trust.
This procedure differs from the first in that two transfers of property occur
and a new, distinct trust is created. The first transfer occurs with a shift in
trust assets from the initial trust to the beneficiaries. The second shift moves
the assets from the beneficiaries to the new trust. Consequently, trust termination raises the potential for significant discontinuity resulting in substantial
tax liability. The extent of discontinuity depends on whether the situs change
is characterized as a termination of the trust in fact or as a mere change of trust
substance.
If deemed a termination in fact both transfers are given full force and
effect. The new trust is treated and recognized as a separate entity. The initial
transfer subjects the beneficiaries to taxation on both current and accumulated
income. 96 If the trust making the transfer is foreign, the section 668 interest
charge applies to the tax on accumulation distributions.- r The beneficiaries
should be able to claim unused loss carryovers and excess deductions on the
termination of the initial trust.98 Beneficiaries would be unable to claim a
distribution deduction for payments personally made after trust termination. 99

94. Issues may arise as to when the initial trust terminates. This does not occur automatically upon happening of the event by which duration of the trust is measured. Treas.
Reg. § 1.641(b)-3(b) (1960). Instead, a reasonable time is permitted after the event for the
trustee to perform duties necessary to complete administration. Id. See, e.g., Studebaker v.
Commissioner, 2 B.T.A. 1020 (1925) (further duties are required of the trustees when there
is no termination); Green v. United States, 6 A.F.T.R.2d 5647 (N.D. Tex. 1960) (trust terminated with death of the son and therefore no further duties remained). See also Rev. Rul.
55-287, 1955-1 C.B. 130 (trust continues for federal taxation during period trustee is allowed
by law of jurisdiction in which trust administered to distribute assets). A trust generally
terminates only when the trustee has finally accounted and title to trust property has vested
in those persons beneficially entitled to it. Swoboda v. United States, 258 F.2d 848 (3d Cir.
1958). But see Treas. Reg. § 1.641(b)-3(b) (1960) (termination cannot be unduly postponed
based on mere technicality such as whether trustee has rendered final accounting).
95. Distribution must vest title to trust property in those persons beneficially entitled
thereto. Swoboda v. United States, 258 F.2d 848 (3rd Cir. 1958). This is done by expressly
spelling out in the trust instrument that on termination title vests automatically. See A. ScoTT,
SCOTT ON TRusTs 2738 (3d ed. 1967).
96. See I.R.C. §§ 652, 662, 665-668 (Supp. V 1981).
97. I.R.C. § 667, 668 (1976).
98. Id. § 642(h); Treas. Reg. § 1.642(h)-l & -2 (1978). Neither loss carryovers nor excess
deductions may be claimed if termination has not occurred in fact. See, e.g., Studebaker v.
Commissioner, 2 B.T.A. 1020 (1925); Weston v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. 1439 (1965) (losses
unavailable to beneficiaries when there is no termination).
99. I.R.C. §§ 651, 661 (West Supp. 1983). The decedent in Green v. United States, 6
A.F.T.R.2d 5647 (1976) (N.D. Tex. 1960), established a testamentary trust with a life estate
in his invalid son. In addition, small payments from the trust were to be made to family
servants. The son died. Id. at 56,18-49. The court concluded that when this occurred the
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The second transfer is made by the beneficiaries to the new trust. This
could result in the beneficiaries being categorized as trust grantors and thus
liable for gift tax. 00 Furthermore, the beneficiaries might be forced to include
the trust assets in their own gross estates for estate tax purposes. This could
occur when a third person creates a life estate in trust corpus for the beneficiaries.101 The beneficiaries may be viewed as receiving the property outright
free from the life estate, on the initial transfer. Each beneficiary is then treated
as having retained a life estate upon the second transfer to the new trust.10 2
Section 2036 mandates including the transferred assets in the beneficiaries'
gross estate. Additionally, any grandfather status for the generation-skipping
transfer tax of a trust in existence on June 11, 1976 will be lost.103
Completing both transfers to create the new trust may activate provisions
previously inapplicable to the initial trust. A shift from domestic to foreign or
from one foreign jurisdiction to another may trigger either the section 679
grantor trust rule 04 or the section 1491 excise tax, 0 5 or may reactivate the
section 644 special two year tax. 0 6 A domestic to foreign shift will invoke the
07
section 668 interest charge.
essential purpose of the trust ceased and the trust terminated. The recipient of the trust
corpus was denied a deduction for payments subsequently made to the servants. Id. at 5649.
100. The basis of the property to the trust is ordinarily that in the beneficiaries' hands.
I.R.C. § 1015(a) (1976). The basis is taken as fair market value only if the beneficiaries' basis
at the time of the gift is greater than fair market value. Id.
101. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 66-68, 1966-1 C.B. 216.
102. But see Estate of Denzer v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 237 (1957) (rejecting this argument). Should inclusion be required, the included amount must be reduced by the value of
the beneficiaries' income interests. The situs rules may also limit inclusion in case of nondomiciliary beneficiaries. See I.R.C. §§ 2101-2108 (West Supp. 1983). A step-up in basis would
not result unless the beneficiary (as grantor retained trust income for life coupled with a
power to revoke. I.R.C. § 1014(b)(2) (1976). See, e.g., Trust of Spero v. Commissioner, 30
T.C. 845 (1958); Rev. Rul. 57-543, 1957-2 C.B. 518.
103. The rules affecting generation skipping transfers generally apply to transfers after
June 11, 1976. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(c), 26 C.F.R. § 2601-1(c) (1980). In the case
of nondomiciliaries, a change of trust situs coupled with a physical relocation of trust assets
could trigger the situs rules for estate, gift, or generation-skipping transfer taxation.
104. I.R.C. § 679 (West Supp. 1983). In the case of a shift from one foreign jurisdiction
to another, § 679 could be triggered in at least two respects even though previously inapplicable. First, if the beneficiaries are United States persons, the Service may seek to
characterize the beneficiaries of the initial trust as grantors of the new trust. Second, if the
grantor of the initial trust has changed status and become a United States person prior to
the situs shift, he may be treated as making an indirect transfer to the new trust. In the case
of a domestic to foreign shift the domestic trust could also be treated as grantor of the
foreign trust. In this event the Service could hypothetically assert that the initial grantor, the
initial trust, and the beneficiaries should all be characterized as grantors of the new trust. It
is doubtful the Service would prevail. The positions are theoretically inconsistent and no
allocation would typically be feasible since each would be treated as having transferred the
same assets to the new trust.
105. I.R.C. § 1491 (Supp. II 1978). The impact of § 1491 on the situs shift is analogous
to that of § 679. See supranote 104.
106. I.R.C. § 644 (Supp. V 1981).
107. I.R.C. § 668 (1976). In a shift from one foreign jurisdiction to another, the charge
will have previously been applicable to the initial foreign trust. The charge applies to the
partial tax imposed on accumulation distributions from the initial foreign trust. Id.
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An alternative is to argue that the second procedure for situs change is not
a termination in fact, but merely a change of the trust's substance. The tax
impact of the change in substance is analogous to that of situs factor retracing
or modification. 10 8 The initial trust is deemed to retain its identity and two
transfers in theory do not occur.
This approach, however, is tenuous and rests primarily on two cases, Buhl
v. Kavanaugh0 9 and MacM anus v. Commissioner.11° In Buhl the grantor
created a revocable trust"' naming his daughter as beneficiary. The corpus
and all accrued income was distributed to the beneficiary with the express
condition that it be used to create a new trust. The Service argued that the
beneficiary was a grantor of the new trust,1 2 and subject to income taxation
under the grantor trust rules." 3 The court characterized the transaction as
merely reshaping the original trust.114 Thus the original grantor rather than
the beneficiary was subject to income taxation under the grantor trust rules.
The grantor in MacManus initially created six revocable trusts. The following year the trusts were made irrevocable, although the grantor reserved the
power to designate beneficiaries.1 5 Two beneficiaries subsequently died and
the assets of their trusts were distributed. The grantor became dissatisfied with
the trustee and sought to replace him. Pursuant to the provision for changing
beneficiaries, the grantor's son was designated sole beneficiary of all four remaining trusts. The grantor's stated purpose was to "facilitate a termination" l r of the trusts in order to change trustees. The son subsequently executed a declaration of trust stating he, as trustee, would hold trust corpus
and income for the remaining four beneficiaries.'117
108. See supra notes 73-93 and accompanying text.
109. 118 F.2d 315 (6th Cir. 1941).
110. 131 F.2d 670 (6th Cir. 1942), rev'g, 44 B.T.A. 508 (1941).
111. The original trust instrument was ambiguous. One provision gave the grantor the
power to terminate the trust outright. A separate provision authorized termination only on
certain conditions. 118 F.2d at 318. Analysis of the underlying facts and circumstances led
the court to conclude the grantor "possessed complete dominion and control of the trust ..
"
Id. at 321. Furthermore, the Service had treated income from the trust as taxable to the
grantor. Id.
112. The form used in creating the new trust did treat the beneficiary as grantor. Yet,
looking to substance, the court believed the original grantor to be grantor in fact. Id. at 321.
113. Id. at 320. The beneficiary would also have been subject to the throwback rules
had they been in effect. Alternatively, the Service could have ignored the beneficiary and
treated the distribution as having been made to the original grantor. Thus, the grantor
would have been subject to taxation on termination and to gift tax on creation of the new
trust.
114. Id. at 321.
115. The grantor expressely reserved:
[T]o himself the power from time to time, and as often as he may think proper, to
designate as beneficiaries, along with or in the place of the said [e.g.] John R. MacManus, any person bearing any of the following relationships to said John, that is to
say, spouse, child, brother, sister, or spouse, or child of a brother or sister;. ...
See MacManus Trust v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 508, 508-509 (1941), rev'd, 131 F.2d 670
(6th Cir. 1942).
116. 131 F.2d 671-72 n.2.
117. Based entirely on form, property rights to all trust assets literally were transferred

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1983

17

Florida Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 5 [1983], Art. 2
1983]

CHOICE OF TRUST SITUS

The MacManus court ignored form. It concluded that the four original
trusts had not merged into one. Instead, each retained its separate trust
identity11s with a mere change of trustees."1 9
Buhl and MacManus, however, are only tenuous support for a situs shift
based on a substance-over-form interpretation of the second procedure. Neither
case concerned a situs change; each trust was apparently reconstituted in the
same jurisdiction where created. Accordingly, the grantors' motivations were
inapposite from those reasons which trigger a situs shift.120 In contrast with
MacManus, the initial trust in Buhl was revocable. The grantor possessed
theoretical control over the trust, its corpus, and accumulated income. The
Buhl court's willingness to ignore form might be partly attributable to the
grantor's power of revocation. There was no need to adopt the formality of
routing corpus and accumulated income through the beneficiary. 2 ' The situs
change procedures discussed herein concern nonrevocable trusts. Thus, the
dubious characterization of the trust termination procedure and corresponding tax effect make it an unsatisfactory means of situs change.
Decanting
In the third procedure for changing situs, decanting, the initial trust makes
a total or partial transfer of trust assets to a separate, distinct trust in the new
jurisdiction. In a total transfer, all property rights including those to current
and accumulated income are vested in the new trust. The initial trust then
terminates.122 In a partial transfer, some portion of property rights are retained
2
by the initial trust. Both the initial and the new trusts continue to exist.1"
to the son as beneficiary. Id. at 671. The son then placed those same rights in trust with
himself as trustee. Id.
118. Buhl was cited for the proposition that the original trust had been reshaped or
remolded. Id. at 673.
119. The original grantor and not his son continued to be treated as the grantor of the
remolded trusts in all respects. Id. at 673-74. This result is consistent with the conclusion
reached in subsequent litigation involving the original grantor's estate. See MacManus Estate
v. Commissioner, 172 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1949), afj'g, 8 T.C. 330 (1947). The court held that
the grantor continued to retain the power to designate beneficiaries even after the change
of trustees. Id. at 700. This retained power triggered inclusion of the value of trust assets in
the grantor's gross estate. Id. at 700-01.
120. The grantor's purpose in Buhl was to change the substantive terms of the original
trust instrument. 118 F.2d at 319. The lack of identity between the terms of the initial and
new trusts is a positive feature. It indicates a degree of discontinuity not triggering an adverse tax impact. In MacManus the grantor's motivation was simply dissatisfaction with the
existing trustee. MacManus v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 670, 671 (6th Cir. 1942), re'g, 44
B.T.A. 508 (1941).
121. See supra note 71.
122. If the transfer is total, the only transfer that is treated as occurring is that from the
initial to the new trust. Without assets, the initial trust cannot continue as a viable entity
but may continue in practice as a mere shell. See A. ScoTT, ScoTT ON TRUSTS § 74 (3d ed.
1967).
123. In a partial transfer, one transfer is treated as occurring initially but a subsequent
transfer is necessary to dispose of any retained property rights. Cf. Lynchburg Trust & Say.
Bank v. Commissioner, 68 F.2d 356 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 292 U.S. 640 (1934) (two new
trusts resulted from partial decanting of initial trust). But see Urquhart v. Commissioner,
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This procedure differs from the first two. In the first, no new trust is created
and no transfer is treated as occurring. In the second, two transfers of property
occur and a new trust is created. The third procedure involves only one
transfer, from the initial to the new trust.
Even only one transfer raises a potential for substantial discontinuity with
resultant tax liability. The new trust is taxed on current income and, to the
extent authorized by the throwback rules, on accumulated income.124 Distributions from a foreign trust trigger the section 668 interest charge to the
25
partial tax on accumulation distributions.1

In addition, section 679 may be activated when, for example, a foreign
trust not previously subject to section 679 decants to a domestic one. A property transfer to a United States beneficiary is required under section 679.128
The new domestic trust may be treated as a beneficiary for the purpose of
applying section 679 to undistributed net income.127 Furthermore, grandfathered benefits for avoiding both section 679 and the generation-skipping
28
transfer tax may be lost by completing the transfer.'
Despite these tax liabilities, the third procedure has some positive features.
If the initial trust totally decants, then terminates, the new trust should be
able to claim unused loss carryovers and excess deductions of the initial
trust.

29

In addition, because the transfer is from one trust to another, the

section 644 two-year period for trust distributions should not be reactivated.130
125 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1942) (no new trust brought into existence since no transfer as occuring). See also supra note 72 (analyzing both cases).
124. The new trust theoretically can be taxed as a beneficiary. Treas. Reg. § 1.643(c)-1
(1956). Yet as a new trust it will have no preceding taxable years to which an accumulation
distribution can be allocated. I.R.C. § 667(a) (1967). Though beneficiaries of the new trust
could have such years, they should not be treated as constructively receiving the distribution unless vested rights are acquired in the distribution. Compare Lynchburg Trust &
Sav. Bank v. Commissioner, 68 F.2d 356 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 292 U.S. 640 (1934) with
Urquhart v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1942).
Subsequent distribution of income accumulated by the initial trust to beneficiaries of the
new trust triggers a number of potential results. The results vary depending on whether
distribution is immediate or delayed. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.665(b)-IA(b)(1) (1972). First,
if distribution is immediate, the new trust arguably has no preceding taxable years and the

throwback rules are inapplicable. I.R.C. § 665(e) (1976). Second, the new trust may be
ignored and the accumulation distribution treated as made directly to the ultimate beneficiaries. Treas. Reg. § 1.665(b)-lA(b)(1) (1972). Third, the preceding taxable years of the
initial trust are tacked on to those of the new trust. Id.
125. I.R.C. §§ 667(a)(3), 668 (1976).
126.

I.R.C. § 679(b).

127. Id.
128. Section 679 applies to transfers to existing foreign trusts after May 21, 1974, and to
all new trusts created after that date. For the generation-skipping transfer tax, the grandfathered status of those trusts in existence on June 11, 1976, vill be lost. Proposed Treas.
Reg. § 26.2601-1(c), 26 C.F.R. § 2601-1(c) (1980).
129. I.R.C. § 642(h) (1976); Treas. Reg. § 1.642(h)-i, -2 (1978). Loss carryovers and
excess deductions can be claimed by those "beneficiaries succeeding to the property of the ...
trust." I.R.C. § 642(h) (1976). For this purpose, a beneficiary can include a trust or an individual. Treas. Reg. § 1.642(h)-3(c) (1956).
130. I.R.C. § 644 (Supp. V 1981). In a transfer from one trust to another, the two year
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DraftingProvisionsfor ChangingSitus
The key provisions for changing situs must be expressly spelled out in the
trust instrument. These provisions may be broken down into three principal
components: authorization for the situs change, allowable investments, and the
procedure employed in effecting the change. Each component must be drafted
with great care.
The provision authorizing the situs shift is the "force majeure" clause.181
Its wording must clearly reflect the key activating feature which triggers the
situs shift. This force majeure could be a specific event, a series of events, a
third party's exercising independent discretion, or a combination of factors.
Perhaps the best approach to drafting a situs change provision is to couple
a series of specific events with the exercise of independent discretion. Relying
only on a separate event or a series of events is risky. The events, if too narrowly drafted, may trigger the situs shift too late to avoid an unperceived yet
very real threat. If the provision is too broadly drafted, the change may occur
prematurely and unnecessarily. Combining a series of specific events with the
exercise of independent discretion permits providing for the unexpected without granting unlimited discretion. The drafter tempers the third party's discretion by mandating a situs shift when certain narrowly defined events
occur." 2 These enumerated events are not inclusive, but merely reflect other
events which through the exercise of discretion may also precipitate a situs
shift.ass
period runs from the date of the initial transfer in trust. I.R.C. § 644(a)(1)(A) (Supp. II
1978).
131.

The term force majeure is defined as a superior or irresistible force.

BLACK'S LAW

DICTIoNARY 774 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). The clause is ordinarily given effect. See UNIt. PROB.
CODE § 7-305 (1969) ("[t]rust provisions relating to the place of administration and to
"). An exception arises
changes in the place of administration or of trustee [shall] control ..
where authorization is controlled by statute. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1139.1 (West 1981).
Despite presence of force majeure clause, if the situs shift is contested negative results may
follow. Cf. In re Hudson, 29 A.D.2d 145, 286 N.Y.S.2d 327 (App. Div. 1968), afJ'd, 23 N.Y.2d
834, 245 N.E.2d 405, 297 N.Y.S.2d 736 (1969) (authorization did not justify the conclusion
that a trustee from a different rather than same jurisdiction should be appointed); Kemp v.
Patterson, 6 N.Y.2d 40, 159 N.E.2d 661, 188 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1959) (refusal to terminate
despite taxation of trust income at a rate in excess of 90%). A potential solution is for all
interested parties, the trustee and all beneficiaries (actual and potential) to agree not to
contest the situs issue.
132. The following is an example of a force majeure clause:
A change in the situs of this trust shall occur automatically upon the happening of
any of the following:
(1) existence of war or revolution in or invasion of the situs juridiction;
(2) action by the situs jurisdiction which
(a) confiscates or expropriates trusts corpus,
(b) liquidates or dissolves the trust,
(c) substitutes new trust beneficiaries, or
(d) restricts, suspends, or abrogates this trust instrument, in whole or part.
Full and independent authority at any time during existence of this trust to make any
further situs changes shall vest in the sole discretion of
133. See id.
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The capacity of the person with whom discretion rests is important. This
may be the trustee, executor (for a testamentary trust), or an independent
third party. 134 Independent. third parties are often best suited since their
economic interests are generally detached and not interwoven with retaining
situs in a particular jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the party with whom discretion
ultimately rests should not be one subject to governmental authority in the
situs jurisdiction. Otherwise, the party may be intimidated by the threat of
official sanction for the exercise of discretion. 13
The trust instrument must also spell out the impact of the situs shift on
allowable investments. The law of the new jurisdiction must authorize all trust
investments irrespective of the procedure employed to change situs. Furthermore, the trust should be expressly authorized to hold investments to the full
extent allowed by the law of the new jurisdiction. 136 One approach to delineating investment powers is to provide broad, flexible powers qualified by a
134. An independent third party holding this power must be truly independent and not
a mere agent of the grantor. Otherwise, includability in the gross estate may result. See
Rev. Rul. 79-353, 1979-2 C.B. 325, modified by, Rev. Rul. 81-51, 1981-1 C.B. 458.
135. Omission of a force majeure clause lessens the prospect but does not preclude a
change of situs. A number of approaches are available. The first is to obtain entry of an order
authorizing the shift in the new jurisdiction. See R. HENDRICKSON & N. SiLVERMAN, supra
note 3, at 4-11. A second approach is to transfer situs only after obtaining the express consent of all interested parties. This avoids need for court intervention. This approach is
sometimes combined with a force majeure clause.
A third approach in the absence of a force majeure clause is pursuant to court order
entered in the initial situs jurisdiction. It is this approach which principally has been the
subject of litigation. Several factors have been emphasized, such as the grantor's implied
intent. In New York, cases authorizing a situs shift have expressly relied on this factor. See
In re Benedito, 83 Misc. 2d 740, 370 N.Y.S.2d 478 (Sur. 1975); In re Weinberger, 21 A.D.2d
780, 250 N.Y.S.2d 887 (App. Div. 1964); In re Smart, 15 Misc. 2d 906, 181 N.Y.S.2d 647 (Sup.
Ct. 1958); In re Matthiessen, 195 Misc. 598, 87 N.Y.S.2d 787 (Sup. Ct. 1949). Cases denying a
situs change have done likewise. See In re Hudson, 29 A.D.2d 145, 286 N.Y.S.2d 327 (App.
Div. 1968), aff'd, 24 N.Y.2d 834, 297 N.Y.S.2d 736, 245 N.E.2d 405 (1966); In re Flexner, 7
Misc. 2d 621, 166 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Sup. Ct. 1957); In re Firth, 205 Misc. 101, 127 N.Y.S.2d 407
(Sur. 1953). See also Finch v. Reese, 28 Conn. 509, 268 A.2d 409 (1970) (Connecticut looks
both to grantor's implied intent and the benefit to trust administration).
Another factor emphasized by the courts is the benefit to trust administration. See Martin
v. Haycock, 22 N.J. 1, 123 A.2d 223 (1956) (approving a change of situs from New Jersey
to Ireland). Finally, the bona fide residence of the beneficiaries has also been considered
important. In In re Weston's Settlements [1968], 1 All E.R. 720 Ch. D, the court refused to
authorize a change in situs from England to Jersey. The beneficiaries had no real ties with
Jersey and it was not established that they intended to continue to live there. The court
concluded that the principal purpose of the change was tax avoidance. Id. at 725. This is in
contrast with In re Whitehead's Will Trusts [1971], 2 All E.R. 1334 Ch. D. There the party
seeking the change established a hotel business in Jersey and had lived there with his family
for over ten years. Id. at 1335. Because of bona fide residence, the English court permitted
the situs change though tax avoidance was unquestionably a motive for the change. Id. at
1339. See also In re Windeatt's Will Trusts [1969], 2 All E.R. 324 Ci. D (English situs
changed to Jersey); In re Scale's Marriage Settlement [1961], 3 All E.R. 136 Ch. D (English
situs changed to Canada); In re Liddiard [1880], 14 Ch. D 310 (English situs changed to
Australia).
136. Cf. A. Sco'rr, supra note 95, at 2763 (distributee can properly receive any property
which is proper trust investment).
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general prohibition of investments not authorized by the situs jurisdiction.
Investments held prior to the situs shift that are not allowed under the law of
the new situs must be liquidated expeditiously. If the shift is to be made by
trust termination or decanting, the trust instrument should clearly direct the
trustee to distribute the property in kind.137 Absent such a provision, the property may have to be sold and the proceeds distributed. 38
The trust instrument should also expressly set out the procedure for effecting the situs change. Because situs factor retracing or modification provides
the greatest degree of tax certainty, it will normally be used. To implement
this procedure, the trust instrument should spell out that legal title to trust
property passes automatically to the new trustee. 3 9 Thus the need for actual
transfer of legal title by the initial trustee is avoided.1 40 Because the initial
trustee must transfer possession of trust property,14 ' it is important that the
trust instrument details the procedure for determining the new trustee. The
initial trustee runs the risk of liability if trust property is turned over to the
wrong person.1 42 Though the risk can be avoided by obtaining a decree from
a court of competent jurisdiction, this cumbersome procedure tends to under14 3
mine the very reasons for shifting situs in the first instance.
CONCLUSION

A tax planner has the option of creating either a foreign or domestic situs
for his client's trust. The key to making a choice is a thorough understanding
of the section 679 grantor trust rule, the excise tax and the applicable laws of
any proposed foreign jurisdictions. Careful planning is particularly important
when dealing with civil law jurisdictions because the civil law generally grants
no explicit authority for trust creation. Common law jurisdictions explicitly
provide for trusts. Laws concerning trust validity, administration and restraints on alienation should be examihed before choosing a particular common law situs.
If the standing requirements are met, income tax treaties can be the most
effective means of providing a suitable foreign trust situs. However, conflict
of laws problems can arise when dealing with a treaty. Provided the standing
and choice of law problems are resolved, a foreign jurisdiction with a favorable
income tax treaty may be more favorable to an individual client than any
domestic trust situs.
137. Id. at 2751.
138.

Id.

139. Id. at 2738.
140. The trustee may be required to execute appropriate documentation to clear record
title. Id. at 2739. In the absence of express provision, title does not vest automatically. Id.
An exception arises in the case of realty. The Statute of Uses effects transfer automatically
without need for conveyance by the trustee. See Swoboda v. United States, 258 F.2d 848, 850
(3d Cir. 1958). Legal title to personalty continues to remain with the trustee until transferred.
A. Scorr, supra note 95, at 2738.

141. The trustee is entitled to be compensated fully for administering the trust before
transferring possession. A. Scorr, supranote 95, at 2742.
142. Personal liability may also result if the delay in transferring posession is unreasonable. Id. at 2741.
143. These include protecting against confiscation in the event of political instability.
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Appendix
UNITED STATES TAX TREATY TABLES
United States Income Tax Treaties'

Contracting
State

Date
Effective

Treaty
Classification

International
Citation

Treasury
Citation

Treasury
Decisions

Australia

1 Jan.
1953

pre-OECD

4 U.S.T. 789,
T.I.A.S. No. 2880

1958-2
C.B. 1029

6108, 1954-2
C.B. 614

Austria

1 Jan.
1957

pre-OECD

8 U.S.T. 1699,
T.I.A.S. No. 3923

1957-2
C.B. 985

6322, 1958-2
C.B. 1038

Belgium2

1 Jan.
1953

pre-OECD

4 U.S.T. 1647,
T.I.A.S. No. 2833

1954-2
C.B. 626

6056, 1954-1
C.B. 132; 6160,
1956-1 C.B. 815

10 U.S.T. 1358,
T.I.A.S. No. 4280

1960-1
C.B. 740
& 753

6438, 1960-1
C.B. 739; 6469,
1960-1 C.B. 752

Amendment

I Jan.
1959

Belgium

1 Jan.
1971

OECD

23 U.S.T. 2687,
T.I.A.S. No. 7463

1973-1
C.B. 619

None issued

Canada

1 Jan.
1941

pre-OECD

56 Stat. 1399,
6 Bevans 244,
T.S. No. 983

1943
C.B. 526

5206, 1943
C.B. 526
6047, 1953-2
C.B. 59

Amendment

1 Jan.
1951

2 U.S.T. 2235,
T.I.A.S. No. 2347

1955-1
C.B. 624

Amendment

1 Jan.
1957

8 U.S.T. 1619,
T.I.A.S. No. 3916

1957-2
C.B. 1014

Amendment

20 Dec.
1967

18 U.S.T. 3186,
T.I.A.S. No. 6415

1968-1
C.B. 628

62 Stat. (2)
1730, 7 Bevans
131, T.I.A.S.
No. 1854

1950-1
C.B. 77

5692, 1959-1
C.B. 104; 5777,
1950-1 C.B. 76

22 U.S.T. 40,
T.I.A.S. No. 7042

1971-1
C.B. 513

None issued

Denmark

I Jan.
1948

pre-OECD

Egypt

1 Jan.
1982

OECD

Finland

28 Feb.
1971

OECD

1. Existing treaties reflected in this Table with Australia, Austria, Belgium, Finland,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands Antilles, Pakistan, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and
Tobago, and the USSR are being renegotiated. Treaties with China, Costa Rica, Nigeria,
Sri Lanka, and Tunisia are being negotiated but nothing has yet been signed.
2. Extends only to the following former Belgian colonies: Ziare, Rwanda, and Burundi.
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Appendix (Continued)

Contracting
State
France

Date
Effective
I Jan.
1967

Treaty
Classification

International
Citation
19 U.S.T. 5280,

OECD

Treasury
Citation

T.I.A.S. No. 6518

1968-2
C.B. 691

Protocol

1 Jan.
1970

23 U.S.T. 20,
T.I.A.S. No. 7270

1972-1
C.B. 438

Protocol

1 Jan.
1979

30 U.S.T. 5109,
T.I.A.S. No. 9500

1979-2
C.B. 411

Germany
Protocol

Greece
Protocol

1 Jan.
1954

pre-OECD

5 U.S.T. 2768,
T.IA.S. No. 3133

1955-1
C.B. 635

Various

OECD

16 U.S.T. 1875,
T.IA.S. No. 5920

1966-1
C.B. 360

1 Jan.
1953

pre-OECD

5 U.S.T. 47,
T.I.A.S. No. 2902

1958-2
C.B. 1054

5 U.S.T. 47,
T.I.A.S. 2902

1958-2
C.B. 1059

1 Jan.
1953

Treasury
Decisions
6986, 1969-1
C.B. 565

6122, 1955-1
C.B. 641

6109, 1954-2
C.B. 638

Hungary

1 Jan.
1980

OECD

30 U.S.T. 6357,
T.I.A.S. 9560

1980-1
C.B. 333

None issued

Iceland

1 Jan.
1976

OECD

26 U.S.T. 2004,
T.I.A.S. No. 8151

1976-1
C.B. 442

None issued

Ireland

1 Jan.
1951

pre-OECD

2 U.S.T. 2503,
T.I.A.S. No. 2356

1958-2
C.B. 1060

5897, 1952-1
C.B. 89

Italy

1 Jan.
1956

pre-OECD

7 U.S.T. 2999,
T.IA.S. No. 3679

1956-2
-C.B. 1096

6215, 1956-2
C.B. 1-105

Jamaica

1 Jan.
1982

OECD

Japan

1 Jan.
1973

OECD

23 U.S.T. 967,
T.I.A.S. No. 7565

1973-1
C.B. 650

None issued

Korea

1 Jan.
1980

OECD

30 U.S.T. 5253,
T.I.A.S. No. 9506

1979-2
C.B. 435

None issued

Luxembourg

I Jan.
1964

OECD

15 U.S.T. 2555,
T.I.A.S. No. 5726

1965-1
C.B. 615

Malta

1 Jan.
1982

OECD
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Contracting
State
Morocco

Netherlands

)ate
E ective

Treaty
Classification

Jan.
1*
1981

OECD

1 Jan.
1947

pre-OECD

International
Citation

Treasury
Cit;ation

Treasury
Decisions

62 Stat. (2)
1757, 10 Bevans
225, T.I.A.S.
No. 1855

195 0-1
C.B. 93

5690,1949-1
C.B. 92; 5778,
1950-1 C.B. 92

6 U.S.T. 3696,
T.I.A.S. 3366

1956-2
C.B. 1116

6153,1955-2
G.B. 777

Amendment

10 Nov.
1955

Amendment

1 Jan.
1967

OECD

17 U.S.T. 896,
T.I.A.S. No. 6051

1967-2
C.B. 572

1 Jan.
1955

pre-OECD

6 U.S.T. 3703,
T.I.A.S. No. 3367

1956-2
C.B. 1116

15 U.S.T. 1900,
T.I.A.S. No. 5665

1965-1
C.B. 624

Netherlands
Antilles
Protocol

Various

6153,1955-2
C.B. 777

New Zealand

1 Jan.
1951

pre-OECD

2 U.S.T. 2398,
T.I.A.S. No. 2360

1958-2
C.B. 1071

5957, 1953-1
C.B. 238

Norway

1 Jan.
1971

OECD

23 U.S.T. 2832,
T.I.A.S. No. 7474

1973-1
C.B. 669

None issued

10 U.S.T. 984,
T.I.A.S. No. 4232

1960-2
C.B. 646

6431, 1960-1
C.B. 755

Amendment

Dec.
1981

Pakistan

1 Jan.
1959

pre-OECD

Philippines

1 Jan.
1983

OECD

Poland

1 Jan.
1974

OECD

28 U.S.T. 891,
T.I.A.S. No. 8486

1977-1
C.B. 416

None issued

Romania

1 Jan.
1974

OECD

27 U.S.T. 165,
T.I.A.S. No. 8228

1976-2
C.B. 492

None issued

South Africa

1 July
1946

pre-OECD

3 U.S.T. 3821,
T.I.A.S. No. 2510

1954-2
C.B. 651

None issued

Protocol

1 July
1948

3 U.S.T. 3821,
T.I.A.S. No. 2510

1954-2
C.B. 655
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Appendix (Continued)

Contracting
State
Sweden

Treaty
Classification

Date
Effective

International
Citation

Treasury
Citation

Treasury
Decisions

1 Jan.
1940

pre-OECD

54 Stat. 1759,
11 Bevans 809,
T.A.S. No. 958

1940-2
C.B. 43

Various

OECD

15 U.S.T. 1824,
T.I.A.S. No. 5656

1965-1
C.B. 626

Switzerland

1 Jan.
1951

pre-OECD

9 U.S.T. 3972,
TI.A.S. No. 2316

1955-2
C.B. 815

5867, 1951-2
C.B. 75; 6159,
1955-2 C.B. 814

Trinidad
and Tobago

1 Jan.
1970

OECD

22 U.S.T. 164,
T.I.A.S. No. 7047

1971-2
C.B. 479

None issued

USSR3

1 Jan.
1976

27 U.S.T. 1,
T.I.A.S. No. 8225

1976-2
C.B. 463

None issued

United
Kingdom

I Jan.
1975

OECD

- U.S.T. -,
T.I.S. No. 9682

1980-1
C.B. 394

None issued

United
Kingdom4

1 Jan.
1945

pre-OECD

60 Stat. 1377,
12 Bevans 671,
T.IA.S. No. 1546

1947-1
C.B. 209

5532, 1946-2
C.B. 73; 5569,
1947-2 C.B. 100

Amendment

4975, 1940-2
C.B. 43

Amendment

19 Jan.
1955

6 U.S.T. 37,
T.I.A.S. No. 3165

1957-1
C.B. 665

Amendment

1 Jan.
1956

9 U.S.T. 1329,
T.I.A.S. No. 4124

1958-2
C.B. 1078

Amendment

1 Jan.
1959

9 U.S.T. 1459,
T.I.A.S. No. 4141

1960-2
C.B. 653

6437, 1960-1
C.B. 767

Amendment

1 Jan.
1966

17 U.S.T. 1254,
T.LA.S. No. 6089

1966-2
C.B. 582

6898, 1966-2
C.B. 567

Argentina

Not yet effective Signed 7 May 1981

Bangladesh

Not yet effective Signed 6 Oct. 1980

Brazil

Not yet effective Signed 13 Mar. 1967

3. Though the effective date of the treaty with the USSR is subsequent to the OECD
Model treaty, the treaty with that country is not based on the OECD model due to its unique
taxing system.
4. Extends to former United Kingdom colonies such as Barbados, Gambia, Sierra Leone,
and Zambia.
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Appendix (Continued)

Contracting
State

Date
Effective

Treaty
Classification

International
Citation

British
Virgin
Islands5

Not yet effective Signed 20 Feb. 1981

Cyprus

Not yet effective
Signed 26 Mar. 1980

Honduras

Treaty Terminated
31 Dec. 1966

Israel

Not yet effective-Treaty originally signed 20 Nov. 1975;
Protocol signed 20 May 1980

Netherlands
AntillesO

Not yet effective-Negotiations held 9 June 1980

Thailand

Not yet effective -Signed I Mar. 1965

Treasury
Citation

Treasury
Decisions

5. The extension of the 1945 United Kingdom treaty to the British Virgin Islands was
terminated on June 30, 1982. The termination is effective January 1, 1983.
6. The Netherlands Antilles are presently covered by an extension of the 1917 income
tax treaty with the Netherlands. That coverage will continue until either the proposed
treaty becomes effective or the extension is terminated.
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